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In the Suprelne Court of the State of Idaho
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE
DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN,
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually
and in his capacity as a member of the
defendant law firm.
Defendants-Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD
Supreme Court Docket No. 38933-2011
Ada County Docket No. 2010-4458

A STIPULATED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO
IDAHO APPELLATE RULE 30 was filed by counsel for Appellants on October 13, 2011.
Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellants' STIPULATED MOTION TO AUGMENT
RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include the documents
listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Affidavit of Plaintiff Justin S. Reynolds in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment,
with attachments, file-stamped February 14,2011; and
2. Affidavit of Yolanda Hays, with attachments, file-stamped February 14,2011.

f:'

DATED this ~ day of October 2011.
For the Supreme Court

I

,

;

Stephen W. Kenyon, Cierk
cc: Counsel of Record
ORDER GRANTING STIPULATED MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD - Docket No.
38933-2011

Robert C. Huntley ISB#894
The HUNTLEY LAW FIRM PLLC
815 W. Washington Street
P.O. Box 2188
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: 208-388-1230
Facsimile: 208-388-0234
rhuntley@huntleylaw.com

NO.--_ _""Ciii;;:;-_ _ __
FILED
A.M., _ _ _ _
P.M,, _ _ __

FEB 1 4 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
By ABBY GARDEN
DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE
DEVELOPMENT LLC,

Case No. CV OC 1004458
Affidavit of Plaintiff Justin S. Reynolds
in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment

Plaintiffs,

v.
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN,
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually
and in his capacity as a member of the
Defendant Law Finn,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
ss.
County of Ada
)
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I am one of the Plaintiffs in this action and am one of the owners of Sunrise

Development, LLC which was the Plaintiff in Sunrise Development, LLC v. Quasar

Development, LLC., Ada County Case No. CV OC 0717098.
Affidavit of Justin S. Reynolds - 1

2.

I make the statements in this affidavit based upon my personal knowledge and

3.

The Defendants herein, that is, the firm of Trout, Jones, Gledhill, Fuhnnan, P .A.

belief.

and David T. Krueck, represented Sunrise Development, LLC in its case against Quasar
Development, LLC, referenced above (hereinafter "Quasar" case).
4.

In the Quasar proceedings the Defendants seldom, if ever, provided me or any

other officer or agent of Sunrise Development with copies of the pleadings in that action.
Specifically, we were never provided with the response memorandum by the Defendant Quasar
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment file December 21, 2007 nor were we provided with
a copy of Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed
February 6, 2008.
5.

In Judge Williamson's Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary

Judgment (Appendix A hereto), the Court stated in part at page 3:
"b. The moving party shall file any supplemental affidavits or reply briefs within
seven days of the filing of the opposing brief.

.. .. *
Defendant filed its opposing memorandum and affidavit on December 21, 2007.
Plaintiff did not file its reply memorandum until February 8, 2008. Therefore,
Plaintiffs' reply memorandum was due by December 28, 2007.

* .. *
In this case, the Reply was filed over a month late and contrary to the Court's
Scheduling Order. Therefore, as a sanction for failing to comply with the Court's
order the Reply is stricken and will not be considered."
6.

Our attorneys did not advise us that the Defendants' response brief raised any

issue about the failure of our attorneys to specify a time deadline for return of earnest monies

Affidavit of ;Justin S. Reynolds - 2

under the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement which they drafted for us. Further, our
attorneys never advised us that they had failed to file their reply brief by the Court ordered
deadline and they did not advise us that the Court rejected the "late filed brief." It was not until
after the Court's Order on Summary Judgment that I or any officer of Sunrise became aware of
the deficiency in the drafting of the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement in its failure to
specify a date or time deadline for refund of the earnest money.
7.

Had the deficiency not existed, Judgment would have been entered immediately

for the refunding of the $60,000 earnest money and it would have been immediately recorded by
___ us--in -the -offices of .the Co.unty--.Rec.order in both Ada and Canyon Counties. I was very much
aware of the activities of Quasar dUring that time period and the months which followed and was
aware of the fact that Quasar had properties against which the Judgment would have attached.
Attached hereto as Appendix B are copies of records from the Ada County Recorder's office.
Page 1 is a list of Ada County properties held by Quasar during the time period and pages 2
through 6 list in highlight the real estate transactions Quasar made during the relevant time
period.
8.

As a result of the defective Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement, Plaintiffs

herein have suffered the damages listed in our Complaint, including as a minimum the final
award in the Stipulated Judgment of Judge Williamson in Quasar of $70,488.81, plus an
additional $7,000 plus interest.

DATED this 11th day of February, 2011.

Affidavit of JustiD S. Reynolds - 3

On this 11th day of February, 2011, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, personally appeared Justin S. Reynolds, known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he executed the
same.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
day and year in this certificate first above written.

Affidavit of Justin S. Reynolds - 4

~-
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FILED
~

NO.

F1LEDA.M•._ _P.o/i'JO

MAR 11 2003

IN THE DISTRICf COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SUNRlSE DEVELOPMENT, Il..C .•
An Idaho limited liability company

Case No. CV-OC 07-1709

)

)
)

Plaintiff

ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)
)

)

v.

)

QUASAR DEVELOPMENT, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)

Hearing Date:

February 13, 2008

AttorneY§.:

Plaintiff-David Krueck, Burt Willie (Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan)
Defendants-Michael Spink, Richard Andrus (Spink Butler)

Hearing Purpose:

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment & Defendant's Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

This suit for breach of a real estate purchase agreement was filed September 25. 2007.
On July 21, 2006, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement")

in which the Plaintiff agreed to purchase real property located in Ada County. Idaho. from the
Defendant under certain tenns and conditions.
One of the terms required the Defendant to record the final plat no later than July 31.

2007. which Defendant failed to do. The Agreement provided under section 7(a), entitled.
Closing and Related Matters: "In the event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision
with the Ada County Recorder's Office by July 31, 2007, Buyer may. at its sole discretion,

1

APPENDIX 1\

terminate this Agreement upon written notice to Seller, and Buyer may then obtain a full refund
of the Earnest Money without any further obligations under the tenus of this Agreement." In
dispute is what is meant by the phrase ··full refund of the Earnest Money."
The Agreement laid out the purchase price and the payment tenns, which caned for three
separate deposits, coiJectively referred to as the Earnest Money. The Agreement provided the
following in section 2(a):
The Purchase Price shan be payable in the following manner.
Earnest Money. SeHer acknowledges that Buyer has already deposited the sum of
$5,000.00 (the "Initial Deposit'') with [the escrowee). The InitUil Deposit sludl
become non~refundable to Buyer. and shan be released to the Seller on the
Approval Date, defined below. Within two business days following the execution
of this Agreement, Buyer shall deposit an additional sum of $25.000.00 (the
"Additjonal Deposit") with [the escrowee]. TIu Additional Deposit shall become
non-refundable to Buyer, and shall be released to Seller, on the Approval Date.
[The escrowee] shall hold the Initial pepositJID.dJhe Additional-Deposit under the
standard escrow instructions currently in use by TREG until release to Seller, as
set forthherein. Upon the Approval Date, Buyer shall pay to Seller an amount
equal to $30.000.00 (the "Approval Deposit") within sixty days follOwing
execution of this Agreement. The Initial Deposit. the Additional Deposit, and the
Approval Deposit may be colJectively referred to herein as the "Earnest Money",
The Earnest Money shaH be held by returned to Buyer or delivered to Seller in
accordance with the terms hereof. The Earnest Money shall be applicable to the
purchase Price at Closing. provided that the transaction contemplated by this
Agreement proceeds through Closing.
(emphasis added). Plaintiff deposited the $60,000 Earnest Money as required above.

The

Approval date was defined as August 7. 2006.
Defendant failed to record the final plat by July 31. 2007. and Plaintiff sent a letter

invoking its right to terminate the Agreement and obtain a refund of the Earnest Money.
Defendant refused to pay the fun $60,000, arguing that only the refundable portions of the
Earnest Money. or $30,000, need be paid. Suit was filed on September 25, 2007, and this motion
for summary judgment was filed December 4,2007. The primary issue here is whether section
7(a) contemplated the term "full refund of the Earnest Money'· to inc1ude an Earnest Money, 9r

only those portions that were refundable. Secondarily, Defendants assert that regardless of how
much money is owed to Plaintiffs, there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or
not a reasonable time has passed from the date of Plaintifrs letter demanding a refund.

MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM:

2

Defendant has moved to strike Plaintiffs' reply memorandum because it was filed late.
The Court filed a Notice of Hearing on Summary Judgment and Scheduling Order on December
7. 2001. It -laid out the following schedule:
a. The party opposing the motion shall file its opposing affidavits and answering
briefs within fourteen days from the flJing date of this order.
b. The moving party shan file any supplemental affidavits or reply briefs within
seven days of the filing of the opposing brief.

NO PAR1Y WILL BE PERMITTED TO FILE ANY AFFIDAVITS OR
ADDITIONAL BRIEFING AFTER THE TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN.
THIS ORDER WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE COURT.
Defendant filed its opposing memorandum and affidavit on December 21, 2007. Plaintiff did not

file its rep]y memorandum until February 8, 2008. Therefore. Plain~trs reply memorandum was
due by

~cember 28,

_:Rll~56(c)

than? days

2007 ;_..-

requires reply briefs on- -mot~ons-fef·summary-judgmentto be filed not less

t>efore the daa:eof the' he-arin-g.

-

'

..-

--_._'

However. the rule also allows the Court to alter or

shorten the time periods arid requirements of Rule 56(c) for good cause. This Court has set time
periods for fiJing documents on motions for summary judgment that differ from Rule 56(c) to
anow the Court time to thoroughly review all documents before the hearing. When parties file
late memoranda and affidavits, it creates difficulty not only for the opposing party, but for the
Court as well.

pursuant to Rule 56(c), the Court may "impose costs, attorney fees and sanctions against
a party" for good cause shown. In this case, the Reply was filed over a month tate and contrary
to the Court's scheduling order. Therefore, as a sanction for failing to comply with the Court's

order. the Reply is stricken and will not be considered.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LEGAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

Summary judgment is aILappmpriate remedy

jf

the ooRtooving pafty's "ple-ddlngs,

affidavits, and discovery document~ ...• _read in a l~g~! .~ost [av.()!able to. ~~e Jl~nQloving party,
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476. 50 P.3d 488. 491 (2002)
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the
nonmoving party has failed to show an element essential of her case as to which the nonmoving

3

party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317. 322

(l986).

The burden of proving the absence of material fact is placed upon the moving party.
Thomas

11.

Petricevich

Medical Center Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557. 562 (2002);
\I.

Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969);

Blickenstaff \I. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572,577.97 P.3d 439, 444 (1969); Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476.
50 P.3d at 491. In Celolex, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no need to negate the
nonmoving party's case; instead. the moving party'g burden is discharged when she shows there
is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. Meanwhile, the
adverse

P~y

may not rest on "mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. but must respond., by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific'facts'-showin!'thatthere is

a

genuine issue for trial." I.R.C.P. S6(e). See Thomas. 138 Idaho at 205; Thomson. 137 Idaho at

.' 416~·-5(rp."3d at 491; Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho 'at 577. 97··P.3d.al -444...The adv~p~y~ust
make more than just "condusory'assUtloos" and. in~ a mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough. Blickenstaff. 140 Idaho at 577. 97 P .3d at 444.

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of all $60,000 of
the Earnest Money. .Plaintiff points out that the language designating portions of the Earnest

Money

as "non-refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. but not in this case.

Defendant argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of only $30.000 of the
Earnest Money, because the provision regarding Earnest Money is specific and therefore controls
over the general prOVision regarding the result of Defendant's failure to record the final plat.
When the meaning of a contract is in dispute, the court must first detennine whether or
not the contract is ambiguous. Bondy \I. Levy. 121 Idaho 993. 997, 829 P.2d 134~ 1346 (1992).
In resolvjng this question, the Court must construe the contract as a whole and not by an isolated
.phrase. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc.

\I.

Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co •• 141 Idaho 660, 663. 115 P.3d

-:::~-:::.:. .:::·.-==-=75lT1S4-l2IK)5) (eltini Sellin Seed Co.

(2000». In order to

\I.

Stcae Ins. FUIUt 135 Idaho 434. 437, 18 P.3d 956,959

d~termine whether the contract is ambiguous, the court must detennine

whether its teons are reasonably susceptible to conflicting inteIpretations. Id.; City of Chubbuck.
v. City ofPocateUo, 127 Idaho 198.899 P.2d 411 (1995).
If the tenns of a contract are clear and unambiguous. the interpretation of the contract's
meaning is a question of law. See e.g., AdD County Assessor v. Taylor. 124 Idaho 550, 553. 861
4

.-

,

,

P.2d 1215. 1218 (1993). The purpose of interpreting a contract is to detennine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. Opportunity, LLC. v. Ossewarde. 136
Idaho 602. 601. 38 P.3d 1258, 1263 (2002) (citing RUfler v. MclAughlin, lOt Idaho 292, 612
P.2d 135 (1980». In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as whole and

gi ve meaning

to

all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. Idaho Power Co. v.

Cogeneration. inc., 134 Idaho 738, 9 P.3d 1204 (2000). Common words are given the meaning
applied by l~ymen in daily usage, as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage, in order
to effectuate the intent of the parties. AID Ins. Co. v. Annslrong. 119 Idaho 897, 900, 811 P .2d
507. 510 (Ct. App. 1991). If. on the other hand, the terms of a contract are ambiguous, the
interpre!uti.on of the con~~ct's.m~aning is a _questi~~ of facl Id.; Bondy, 121 Idaho at 997, 829

P.ld at 1346.
The Court detennines that the Agreement is unambiguous, because after reading the fuU
C(;ontr~eG·ooly- one reasonable-conclusion-can be-reacbed----.The_rdeyanLprovision reads: "In the

event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision V/ith the Ada County Recorder's
Office by Ju]y 31, 2007, Buyer may, at its sole discretion, terminate this Agreement upon written
notice to Seiler, and Buyer may then obtain a fun refund of the Earnest Money without any
further obligations under the tenns of this Agreement." As contemplated in section 7(a) of the
Agreement, if the Defendant fails to record the final plat by July 31,2007, the entire $60.000 of
the earnest money is refundable if the Buyer so demands.

Defendant argues that section 2(a) is a specific dause and section 7(a) is a general clause.
and therefore, section 2(a) prevails. However. the Court disagrees. Instead, the Court deems
section 2(a) to be a general clause as it relates to the refundability of the Earnest Money. Section
7(a) is a specific clause describing the consequences of Defendant's failure to file the final plat
by JuJy 31, 2006, which includes a full refund of the Earnest Money to the Plaintiff. "Special

provisions will control over general ones where both relate to the same thing." Morgan v.
Fireslo~ Tire

& Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506. 518, 201 P.2d 976 983 (1948). Therefore, section
y

7(a) requires Defendant to pay aU $60.000 of the Earnest Money to Plaintiff.

Plajntiff argues that

the langyag,e

de~ignating PQrtions. ofihe·-~rn~stMoney as "non-

refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. The Court agrecs-..~There are several
provisions in the contract setting forth the results of one party's failure to perfonn specific duties
under the contraCt. For instance. section 5(b) states: "In the event of a failure of any condition
precedent set forth herein, then Buyer may declare this Agreement nulJ and void, in which event

the refundable Eamest Money. if any. shall be returned to Buyer. and the parties shall have no

5

further obligations or liabilities." Section SA(b) states: "in the event of a failure of any other
condition precedent set forth herein, then SeUer may declare this Agreement null and void, and
the parties shall have no further obligations or liabilities hereunder. Notwithstanding any other

, provision contained herein, in the event this Agreement fails to close because of a failure of
condition precedent 5A(a)(ii) only, Seller agrees to return the Earnest Money fO Buyer.... Both of
these sections refer to "conditions precedent" specifically laid out in sections 5 and SA of the
Agreement.

Section 5(b) clearly contemplates the return of only the refundable portion of the

Earnest Money, while section 5A(b) clearly contemplates the return of aU of the, Earnest
Money-apparentJy the nonrefundable portion as well.
, The' provision at issue, however. is different from both of those clauses. "In the event
SeHer fails to record the final plat.of the Subdivision with the Ada County Recorder's Office by
July 31.2007, Buyer may, at its sole discretion, tenninate this Agreement upon written notice to

. '-s~ner.

andBuyer inay then obiitin a full',e!u;;d o{ihi&lmesc"Money"wfihout any further

.obligations..~nder.1he tenns~f this..Agreem~n~Unlike.the..abov.e~mentioned 5A(b), this section
does not state ·'notwithstanding any other provision," which explicitly ignores section 2(a),
which describes the Initial Deposit

and the Additional Deposit as nonrefundable.

However,

section 7(a) requires a "full refund of the Earnest Money" which dearly specifies that all of the
Earnest Money is to be refunded under this provision.
Next Plaintiff argues that section 15(1) requires the refund to occur immediately. That
section stales "time of, the essence: aU times provided for in this Agreement or in any other
instrument or document referred to herein or contemplated hereby, for the perfonnance of any
act will be strictly construed, it being agreed that time is of the essence in this Agreement."
Defendant counters that 7(a) does not state a specific time for paying the refund, and therefore
performance must merely occur in a reasonable time. The Court agrees that, although the
Agreement includes a "time is of the essence" clause, section 7(a) does not state a specific time
for paying the refund. and therefore petfonnance must merely occur in a reasonable time. Ujdur

v. Thompson, 126 Idaho 6,
--·---"--::--:-:'-:-·~peifonnance·ls

9,

878 P.2d 180. 183 (1994) (Holding that when the time for

not specifieo in a contract, perfCfrrrranClmlusnJccunn--aTeasunaOle-time).

_ _,:_Jin~IIy,. P~;I!!!!tiff~!ls.§.~~.Jn...i!:s_..reply. :J.h.!LP.@ig[~s,_l3._and ,..14. .nLAlvaro·s affidavit
should be ignored by the court because they are irrelevant.

However, it appears that these

statements were filed to show that there was an issue of fact as to whether a "reasonable time"
had passed for Defendant to refund the Earnest Money. Therefore. these paragraphs will not be
stricken.

6

FILED
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NO.
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SEP 1 0 200D

yc...~~I.""".~
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RECE'VED

SEP 022008

~.

- ...-" ....

~

Ada county Cletk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
---

------ --.

--

-

----

- ---

SUNRISE DEVELOPMENTu:c,an---y--- ,-

------~

Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiff:

QUASAR DEVELOPMENT LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company
Defendant

--

-- --

-

--

-

- - --- -

. -. -. ..--.----....- -- ....

. ~ Case No. CV OC 0717098
)

~

VS.

~

JUDGMENT

)
)
)
)

)

This matter having come before the Court upon the parties'

Sti~ulation for

Entry of

Judgment and the Covenant Not to Execute, and good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

That Plaintiff is awarded judgment against Defendant in the amount of Sixty

Thousand and Noll 00 ($60,000.00), plus Plaintiffs costs in the amount of Four Hundred Fifty~
Seven and 311100 Dollars ($457.31), plus Plaintiff's attorney fees in the amount ofTen
Thous~d Thirty-One

ruooMENT-l

Ii'"

and 501100 Dollars (SI0,031.50), for a total judgment in the amount of

APPENDIX

B

"
j"

Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Eight and 811100 Dollars ($70,488.81), with interest
accruing at the judgment rate.

It is hereby ordered, a<ljudged, and decreed this

L

day of

~. 2008.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

10-

. - I HEREBY CERTIFY that on tbis
day of ~ .2008, I caused a
true and correct copy oftbe above JUDGMENT to be serv upon the following in~viduals in
the manner indicated below:
Michael T. Spink

[X] U.S. Mail

Richard H. Andrus
Spink Butler, LLP
251 B. Front Street, Suite 200
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Bolt 639
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 208l388-100t

[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

David T. Krueck
ReidW.Hay

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

Trout~Jones-Gledhi1l-Fuluman, P.A.

225 N. 91lt Street, Suite 820
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Bolt 1097
.
Boise, ID 83701.
.
Facsimile: 2081331-1529 -

.----

ruooMENT-2

---_

_--- ._----.-------

...

·-,

..

.

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the amount of Earnest

Money due. and DENIED as to whether or not a reasonable time has passed for fun refund of the
$60,000.00 earnest money deposited.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

EJI~
Darla WilJiamson. District Judge

- -} 'hereby certify that on this date I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing to:
David Krueck
BurtR. Willie
P.O. Box 1097
Boise. ID 83701

Michael T. Spink .
Richard H. Andrus
P.O. BoX 639
Boise. W 83701
Dated this

.

__

LI-

day of March. 2008

.-----------------_._-----_._------------.------._- - --:=-:-=~~--~-~-.---------.---.----

7

CONFIRMATION

Robert C. Huntley ISB#894
The HUNTLEY LAW FIlUvi PLLC
815 W. Washington Street
P.O. Box 2188
Boise, Idaho 83701
Telephone: 208-388-1230
Facsimile: 208-388-0234
rhuntley@huntleylaw.com

=::--____

NO. _ _ _ _

FILED

A.M.

P.M. _ _ __

FEB t ; 2011
CHRISTOPHER D. filCH, Cler~.
By A8BY GARDEN
DEPUTY

Attorney for Plaintiffs

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JUSTIN S. REYNOLDS and S. KRISTINE
REYNOLDS; and SUNRISE
DEVELOPMENT LLC,

Case No. CV OC 1004458
Affidavit ofYlonda Hays

Plaintiffs,

v.
TROUT JONES GLEDHILL FUHRMAN,
P.A.; and DAVID T. KRUECK, individually
and in his capacity as a member of the
Defendant Law Firm,
Defendants.

STATE OF IDAHO )
ss.
)
County of Ada
Ylonda Hays, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
1.

I have been a licensed and practicing realtor in the state of Idaho since 2000 and

have personal knowledge of the matters herein stated.
2.

I have been informed ofthe Order dated March 11,2008, rendered by Judge Darla

Affidavit of Ylonda Hays - 1

Valuation and Analysis, and Real Estate Finance courses and mandates continuing education in
these areas.
2.

I have been informed of the Order dated March 11,2008, rendered by Judge Darla

Williamson, granting in part PlaintifI's Motion for Summary Judgment filed in Sunrise

Development, UC v. Quasar Development, LLC, Ada County Civil Case No. CV OC 07-17098
a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix A.
3.

In that Order Judge Williamson noted at page 6 that the Real Estate Purchase

Agreement (''the Agreement") provided that "time was of the essence" but did not specify what
would be a specific time period for refunding the eamest money if and when the eamest money
became refundable. Judge Williamson further ruled at page 5 as follows:

"As contemplated in Section 7(a) of the Agreement, if the Defendant fails
to record the fmal plat by July 21, 2007, the entire $60,000 of the earnest
money is refundable if the Buyer so demands."
Judge Willimnson further ruled that the plat had not been recorded by July 21, 2007, and thus
that was the date when the earnest money became refundable.
4.

In Appendix A, Judge Williamson ruled that since no date was specified in the

Agreement, and that there remained a question of fact as to when the refund must be made, that
that·issue must be the subject offurther litigation.
5.

I have further been made aware of the Judgment entered by Judge W:tlliamson on

September 10, 2008, based upon the stipulation of the parties (Appendix B hereto), which
provided for a refunding of the earnest money together with an award of attorney fees and costs,
totaling $70,488.81 which was subject to a Stay of Execution until August 15, 2009.
6.

During the period between July 21, 2007 and March 11, 2008 and extending on to

September 10, 2008, I can testify from my personal knowledge of following sales and purchases
Affidavit ofYloDda Hays - 2

in Idaho that Quasar Development, LLC was engaged in buying and selling and disposing of real
estate in Ada and Canyon counties and therefore, during both time periods, any judgment duly
entered and recorded during either time period would have attached against the properties
involved and would more likely than not have been a potential source from which Sunrise
Development, LLC andlor its owners, Justin and S. Kristine Reynolds, could have expected to
recover all or a substantial portion of their earnest money deposit of $60~OOO.
7.

In addition to my personal knowledge of the sales and transfers of property by

Quasar Development, LLC during the period between July 21, 2007 and March 11, 2008 and
during the period between March 11, 2008 and September 10, 2008, I have personally reviewed
real property transaction records which record sales and transfers by Quasar Development LLC
of real estate during those periods. Attached hereto as Appendix C are copies of Ada County
real estate records, vvith page 1 depicting properties owned by Quasar Development LLC during
the relevant time period and pages 2 through 6 highlighting actual transfers of real estate made
during the relevant time period.
8.

Appendix D reflects basic Purchase and Sale Agreements that specify how much

time a Seller has to refund Earnest Money when the Seller is in default. Exa.rw1es of the pmctice
are the documents attached hereto which provide that an Earnest Money return date specified in
tenus of "20 days", "15 days", "5 days", "forthwith", "upon demand", "immediately" or at a date
certain. It is my opinion that the lack of a similar provision in the capital Agreement between
Sunrise Development LLC and Quasar Development LLC was deficient and prevented Sunrise
from receiving a timely judgment that would have likely resulted in the recovery of Earnest
Money.

Affidavit ofYlonda Hays - 3

Further sayeth Affiant naught.
DATED this 11111 day of February, 2011.

On this 11th day of February, 2011, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and
for said State, personally appeared Ylonda Hays, known or identified to me to be the person
whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed
the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have
day and year in. this certificate first abov

Affidavit ofYlonda Hays - 4

eunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRIcr OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

SUNRISE DEVELOPMENT. LLC.,
An Idaho limited liability company
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v.
QUASAR DEVELOPMENT, lLC, an
Idaho limited liability company,

Defendant.
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)
)

Case No. CV-OC 07-1709

)

ORDER GRANTING IN PART
PLA.INTJ:fF·S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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)
)
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)
)
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)

Hearing Date:

February 13. 2008

Attorneys:

Plaintiff-David Krueck. Burt Willie (Trout Jones Gledhill Fuhnnan)
Defendants-Michael Spink. Richard Andrus (Spink Butler)

Hearing Pu~:

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment & Defendanfs Motion to Strike
Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND:

This suit for breach of a real estate purchase agreement was filed September 25, 2001.
On Ju]y 21,2006, the parties entered into a Real Estate Purchase Agreement (the "Agreement")

in which the Plaintiff agreed to purchase real property located in Ada County, Idaho, from the
Defendant under certain terms and conditions.
One of the terms required the Defendant to record the final plat no later than July 31.
2007, which Defendant failed to do. The Agreement provided under section 7(a), entitled
Closing and Related Matters: uIn the event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision
with the Ada County Recorder's Office by July 31, 2007, Buyer may, at its sole discretion.

J

APPEN.DIX~A.";I

terminate this Agreement upon written notice to Seiter, and Buyer may then obtain a fuil refund
of the Eame st Money without any further obligations under the terms of this Agreement." In
dispute is what is meant by the phrase "full refund of the Earnest Money."
The Agreement laid out the purchase price and the payment tenus, which caned for three
separate deposits, collectively refe.rred to as the Earnest Money. The Agreement provided the
following in section 2(a):

The Purchase Price shan be payable in the fonowing manner.
Eamest Money. Sener acknowledges that Buyer has already deposited the sum of
$5.000.00 (the "Initial Deposit") with [the escrowee]. The Initial Deposit shall
become non-refundable to Buyer, and shall be released to the SeUer on the
Approval Date, defined below. Within two business days following the execution
of thiS Agreement, Buyer shall deposit an additional sum of $25.000.00 (the
"Additional Deposit") with [the escrowee]. The Additional Deposit shall become
non-refulldable to BlIyer, and shan be released to Seller, on the Approval Date.
[The escrowee] shall hold the Initial Deposit and the Additional Deposit under the
standard escrow instructions currently in use by TREG until release to Seller, as
set forthherein. Upon the Approval Date. Buyer shall pay to Seller an amount
equal to $30,000.00 (the "Approval Deposit") within sixty days following
execution of this Agreement. The Initial Deposit, the Additional Deposit, and the
Approval Deposit may be collectively referred to herein as the "Earnest Money".
The Earnest Money shall be held by returned to Buyer or delivered to Seller in
accordance with the tenns hereof. The Earnest Money shall be applicable to the
Purchase Price at Closing. provided that the transaction contemplated by this
Agreement proceeds through Closing.
(emphasis added). Plaintiff deposited the $60,000 Earnest Money as required above.

The

Approval date was defined as August 7, 2006.
Defendant failed to record the final plat by July 31. 2007. and Plaintiff sent a letter
invoking its right to terminate the Agreement and obtain a refund of the Earnest Money.
Defendant refused to pay the full $60,000. arguing that only the refundable portions of the
Earnest Money, or $30,000, need be paid. Suit was filed on September 25, 2007. and this motion

for summary judgment was filed December 4. 2007. The primary issue here is whether section
7(a) contemplated the term "fuH refund of the Earnest Money" to include aU Earnest Money, or
only those portions that were refundable. Secondarily. Defendants assert that regardless of how

much money is owed to Plaintiffs. there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether or
not a reasonable time has passed from the date of Plaintiffs letter demanding a refund

MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REPLY MEMORANDUM:

2

Defendant has moved to strike Plaintiffs' reply memorandum because it was filed late.
The Court fi Jed a Notice of Hearing on Summary Judgment and Scheduling Order on December
7.2007. It '1 aid out the following schedule:
a. The party opposing the motion shall file its opposing affidavits and answering
briefs within fourteen days from the filing date of this order.
b. The moving party shall file any supplemental affidavits or reply briefs withi.
seven days of the filing of the opposing brief.
NO PARTY WILL BE PERMITTED TO FILE ANY AFFIDAVITS OR
ADDITIONAL BRIEFING AFI'ER THE TIME PERIODS SET FORTH IN.
THIS .ORDER WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE COURT.
Defendant filed its opposing memorandum and affidavit on December 21, 2007. Plaintiff did not
file its reply memorandum until February 8, 2008. Therefore. Plaintiff's reply memorandum was
due by Decem~r 28, 2007.
_Rule. 56(c} requires reply briefs ·on motions-for·-summary-judgment to be filed not less
than 7 days before the date of the hearing. Ho\yever, the rule also allows the Court to alter or
shorten the time periods and requirements of Rule 56(c) for good cause. This Court has set time
periods for filing documents on motions for summary judgment that differ from Rule 56(c) to
allow the Court time to thoroughly review an documents before the hearing. When parties file
late memoranda and affidavits, it creates difficulty not only for the opposing party, but for the
Court as well
pursuant to Rule 56(c), the Court may "impose costs, attomey fees and sanctions against
a party" for gOOd cause shown. In this case, the Reply was filed over a month late and contrary
to the Court's scheduling order. Therefore, as a sanction for failing to comply with the Court's
order, the Reply is stricken and will not be considered.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LECAL STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

Summ.ID judgment is an appropriate ICmedy if the

--~----'==-

RQRmOVing p~!p1eadings.

affidavits, and discovery documents ~ .. ,read in a I~.~~ .lJ)ost f.avo!8ble to _t!'elJ~ll,moving party,
demonstrate no material issue of fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491 (2002)
(quoting I.R.C.P. 56). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when tt.e
nonmoving party has failed to show an element essential of her case as to which the nonmoving

3

party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986).
The burden of proving the absence of material fact is placed upon the moving party.

Thomas v. Medical Center Physicians, P.A.. 138 Idaho 200, 205, 61 P.3d 557. 562 (2002);
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969);
Blickenstaffv. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577,97 P.3d 439. 444 (1969); Thomson. 137 Idaho at 476,
50 P.3d at 491. In Celotex, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there is no need to negate the
nonmoving party's case; instead, the moving party's burden is discharged when she shows there
is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex,477 U.S. at 325. Meanwhile. the
adverse party may not rest on "mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but must respond, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, setting forth specific factS showing thatTnere is a
genuine issue for trial." IR.e.p. 56(e). See Thomas, 138 Idaho at 205; Tlwmson, 137 Idaho at

476~5(fP.3dat-491;miCkenstaff, 140-Idaho~ai 577.97

pjd at 444.

The ad~~~-p~y must

make more ihan just "concJusory assertions" and. indeed, a mere scintilla of evidence is not
enough. Blickenstaff, 140 Idaho at 517. 97 P.3d at 444.

ANALYSIS:

Plaintiff argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of all $60,000 of
the Earnest Money. ,Plaintiff points out that the language designating portions of the Earnest
Money as "non-refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. but not in this case.
Defendant argues that the contract is unambiguous and requires the refund of only $30,000 of the
Earnest Money, because the provision regarding Earnest Money is specific and therefore controls
over the general proVision regarding the result of Defendant's failure to record the final plat.
When the meaning of a contract is in dispute. the coun must first detennine whether or
not the contract is ambiguous. Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993. 997.829 P.2d 1342. 1346 (l992).
In resolving this question. the Court must construe the contract as a whole and not by an isolated
.phrase. Cascade Auto Glass, Inc. v. Idaho Farm Bureau Ins. Co.• 141 Idaho 660, 663, 115 P.3d

. 751. 754 (2005) (cltmg Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Ins. Fund, 135 Idaho 434, 437.18 P.3d 956, 959

(2000». In order to detennine whether the contract is ambiguous, the court must determine
whether its tennS are reasonably susceptible to conflicting interpretations. [d.; City of Chubbuck

v. City of Pocatello, J27 Jdaho 198. 899 P .2d 411 (1995).
If the termS of a contract are clear and unambiguous. the interpretation of the contract's
meaning is a question of Jaw. See e.g., Ada County Assessor v. Taylor, 124 Idaho 550. 553,861

P.2d 1215, 1218 (1993). The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. Opportunity. L.LC. v. Ossewarde, 136
Idaho 602. 607. 38 P.3d·1258. 1263 (2002) (citing Ruuer v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 612
P.2d 135 (1980». In construing a written instrument, this Court must consider it as whole and
give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible. Idaho Power Co. v.

Cogeneration, Inc.• 134 Idaho 738. 9 P.3d 1204 (2000). Common words are given the meaning
applied by laymen in daily usage, as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage. in order
to effectuate the intent of the parties. AID Ins. Co. v. Armstrong. 119 Idaho 897. 900~ 811 P.2d
507, 510 (Ct. App. 1991). If, on the other hand, the terms of a contract are ambiguous. the
interpretation of the contract's meaning is a question of fact. Id.; Bondy. 121 Idaho at 997. 829
P.2d at 1346.
The Court detennines that the Agreement is unambiguous. because after reading the full

contract~ only one reasonable conclusion can ·bereached. The relevant provision reads: "In the
event Seller fails to record the final plat of the Subdivision ~th the Ada County Recorder's
Office by July 31, 2007. Buyer may. at its soJe discretion. terminate this AgreelJlCi1t upon written
notice to Senet. and Buyer may then obtain a full refund of the Eamest Money without any
further obligations under the terms of this Agreement." As contemplated in section 7(a) of the
Agreement. if the Defendant fails to record the final plat by July 31. 2007. the entire $60.000 of
the earnest money is refundable if the Buyer so demands.
Defendant argues that section 2{a) is a specifiC clause and section 7(a) is a general clause.
and therefore. section 2(a) prevails. However. the Court disagrees. Instead, the Court deems
section 2(a) to be a genera] clause as it relates to the refundability of the Earnest Money. Section
7(a) is a specific cJause describing the consequences of Defendant's failure to file the final plat
by July 31,

2006. which includes a full

provisions

will control over general ones where both relate to the same thing." Morgan v.

Firesto~

Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506. 518, 201 P.2d 976, 983 (1948). Therefore. section

refund of the Eantest Money to the Plaintiff. "Special

7(a) requires Defendant to pay all $60.000 of the Earnest Money to Plaiiniff.
Plaintiff argues that

the ~language' designatIng portions ot the' EamestMoney' as

"non--~

refundable" may have effect in certain factual scenarios. ·1beCourt agrees;-There are several
provisions in the contract setting forth the results of one party's failure to perform specific duties
under the contract. For instance, section 5(b) states: "In the event of a failure of any condition
precedent set forth herein, then Buyer may declare this Agreement null and void. in which event·

the refundable Eamest Money,

if any, shall be returned to Buyer,

and the parties shall have no

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED as to the amount of Earnest
Money- due, and DENIED as to whether or not a reasonable time has passed for full refund of the
$60,000.00 earnest money deposited.

IT IS sO ORDERED.

.Ji1~
Darla Williamson, District Judge

I hereby certify that on this date I mailed a true and correct cOpy of the above and

foregoing to:
Michael T. Spink .
Richard H. Andrus

David Krueck
Burt R. Willie

P.O. Box 639

P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 8370 1

Boise, ID 83701

Dated this

LI-

day of

M~h, 2~8

ne
ourtcerk
rJ!'~~
Korsen.

uty
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Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Eighty-Eight and 811100 Dollars ($70,488.81), with interest
accruing at the judgment rate.
It is hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed this

'I day of ~. 2008.

~,d~
Darla .• Williamson

.

District Judge

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of ,~ ,2008, I caused a
true and correct copy of the above JUDGMENT to be SefV uponti1efOi1()Wng individuals in
the manner indicated below:

fa-

Michael T. Spink
Richard H. Andrus
Spink Butler, LLP
251 E.. Front Street, Suite 200
Boise. ID 837{}2
P.O. Box 639
Boise, ID 83701
Facsimile: 2081388-1001

[X] U.S. Mail

David T. Krueck
Reid W.Hay
Trout-Jones.G1edhiIJ-Fuhnnan, P.A.
225 N. 9th Street, Suite 820
Boise, ID 83702
P.O. Box 1097
Boise, ID 83701.
_
Facsimile: 2081331-1529

[X] U.S. Mail
[ ] Hand·Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

------

------~-

.-~

........

[ ] Hand-Delivery
[ ] Federal Express
[ ] Via Facsimile

- --- ._---.---

p~~
eputyCler

